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Abstract—This paper presents the Coded Packet Trans-
port (CPT) scheme, a novel transport mechanism for Optical
Packet/Burst Switched (OPS/OBS) networks. The CPT scheme
exploits the combined benefits of source coding by erasure codes
and path diversity to provide efficient means for recovering from
packet loss due to contentions and path failures, and to provide
non-cryptographic secrecy. In the CPT scheme, erasure coding is
employed at the OPS/OBS ingress node to form coded packets,
which are transmitted on disjoint paths from the ingress node
to an egress node in the network. The CPT scheme allows for a
unified view of Quality of Service (QoS) in OPS/OBS networks by
linking the interactions between survivability, performance and
secrecy. We provide analytical models that illustrate how QoS
aspects of CPT are affected by the number of disjoint paths,
packet overhead and processing delay.
Keywords: optical packet/burst switching, source coding,
survivability, secrecy, performance
I. INTRODUCTION
Optical Packet/Burst Switching (OPS/OBS) is a promising
architecture for the future core network, enabling all-optical
packet transport combined with statistical multiplexing for
increased link utilization [6]. By avoiding electronic process-
ing of packets, OPS/OBS achieves significant energy savings
compared to existing opaque packet switched architectures
[24]. The increasing number of mission-critical services such
as e-banking, e-voting and emergency services put a high
demand on the Quality of Service (QoS) of the future Inter-
net, including OPS/OBS networks. Specifically, the OPS/OBS
network has to provide low packet loss rate (performance)
[18], [19], [26], [27], protection against node and link failures
(survivability) [5], [20], as well as being able to withstand
targeted eavesdropping attacks from individuals and organiza-
tions (secrecy) [11].
Existing approaches to satisfy these strict QoS demands
in OPS/OBS rely on the provision of several independent
QoS schemes, e.g., wavelength conversion to reduce packet
loss from contentions and 1+1 path protection to provide
survivability. However, since these schemes are deployed in
the same physical and logical infrastructure, they will interact
and provide mutual benefits. Examples of this include how the
extra redundancy introduced for providing 1+1 path protection
may be used to combat packet loss in OPS networks in
failure-free operations, as studied in [20]. In particular, security
threats in all-optical networks have recently received research
attention [3], [12]. One crucial security threat is eavesdropping
of data in the network, which has traditionally been countered
using encryption. However, the high capacities of OPS/OBS
networks greater than 100 Gb/s make data encryption in
OPS/OBS not feasible as the current computational resources
do not match the required encryption processing demands.
Hence, there is a need for a low complexity scheme that pro-
vides a certain level of secure data transport without encrypting
the data. Our goal is to show how erasure coding and path
diversity can be used to mutually provide loss recovery from
contentions, survivability and a secrecy of data.
The major contribution of this paper is the novel Coded
Packet Transport (CPT) scheme for OPS/OBS networks. This
scheme is able to recover lost data due to contentions and
node/link failures, while at the same time providing secrecy.
We use the term secrecy as defined in [11], where the goal
is protection from a passive adversary that is not able to
reconstruct the whole packet/burst set by eavesdropping on
a single path. The CPT scheme is based on Forward Error
Correction (FEC) codes used as erasure codes and provides
non-cryptographic secrecy. The CPT scheme is applicable to
both OPS and OBS networks, and for the remainder of the
paper we use the term packet to also refer to a burst in
OBS networks, without the loss of generality. At an OPS/OBS
ingress node, a set of data packets is encoded into a set
of coded packets by utilizing non-systematic erasure codes
[9], [17], [25]. These coded packets are transmitted to an
egress node in the OPS/OBS network on multiple disjoint
paths. At an OPS/OBS egress node, reconstruction of packets
lost due to contentions and node/link failures is enabled by
the added redundancy. Sending different subsets of packets
over disjoint paths between the ingress and the egress node
also enables an end-to-end secrecy property against a passive
adversary. To the best of our knowledge, this work constitutes
a first step for providing a unified view on QoS in OPS/OBS
networks, focusing on the interactions between survivability,
performance and secrecy.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section
II discusses related works. In Section III we present the
CPT scheme. Section IV presents the analytical model. The
parameter settings based on the analytical model are presented
in Section V. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORKS
The authors of [17] and [25] show how FEC codes can be
used to reduce packet loss in OPS networks. Here, redundant
packets are added to a set of data packets at the OPS ingress
node and transmitted along with the original data packets to
an OPS egress node. Data packets dropped due to contentions
may be reconstructed at the OPS egress node by using excess
redundant packets, leading to a potential reduced Packet Loss
Rate (PLR). The work in [20] and [16] extends these schemes
to provide 1+1 path protection. One redundant packet is added
to a packet set using the XOR operation. This packet set is
transmitted to the OPS egress node over three or more disjoint
paths. In particular, the authors of [16] evaluate this scheme
from a cost perspective, comparing it to other approaches
that provide 1+1 path protection, showing that significant
cost savings can be achieved using erasure codes. Unlike the
present paper, these schemes do not consider secrecy.
The authors of [14] show how the PLR can be significantly
reduced by sending packets at appropriate rates on disjoint
paths from multiple ingress nodes to an egress node by using
FEC techniques. The work is further extended in [13] where
a scalable, heuristic scheme for selecting a redundant path
between an ingress node and an egress node is presented.
Another way of reducing the packet loss due to contentions
in OPS networks is by combining source and network coding.
Instead of dropping the colliding packets at the intermediate
node, they are XOR-ed together [2], [7].
The authors of [3] suggest an OBS framework that pro-
vides authentication of burst headers and confidentiality of
data bursts based on encryption. However, due to the high
bandwidth in OBS networks, the encryption mechanisms have
to be with low computational complexity, suitable for high-
speed implementation and the majority of the header content
should not be encrypted since the processing of the headers
has to be at ultra high speed [3]. Unlike their work, we
provide a certain level of non-cryptographic secrecy in the data
transport without using encryption, thus significantly reducing
the computational complexity.
That secrecy is achieved by sending non-systematic coded
packets on disjoint paths. This property has so far not been
exploited in OPS/OBS networks. The authors of [15] show
how to provide secrecy in storage systems even when an
eavesdropper knows or can guess some of the missing sym-
bols. This is achieved by using MDS matrices (matrices that
have no singular square submatrices). On the other hand,
schemes based on non-systematic codes increase the delay in
the networks, as decoding of non-systematic coded packets
can start after the number of received coded packets is at
least equal to the number of original data packets. In addition,
the encoding and decoding of the packets also add processing
delay in the network.
III. CODED PACKET TRANSPORT (CPT)
We focus on an ingress and egress node pair (ni, ne) in
an OPS/OBS network as depicted in Fig. 1. Packets arrive at
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Fig. 1. An OPS network where data is transmitted from ingress node ni to
egress node ne
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Fig. 2. Illustration of CPT, k data packets are encoded into n coded packets
at ni and transmitted over l disjoint paths
ni from a legacy network A, with destination ne or a legacy
network B. We assume that there exist l disjoint paths between
ni and ne. We use the term disjoint paths to refer to node
disjoint (respectively link disjoint) paths between two nodes
in the network. The ingress node ni encodes the k data packets
into n coded packets. The disjoint paths are independent and
disjunctive subsets of the coded packets are sent on them.
Figure 2 depicts the encoding of k data packets with equal
length into n coded packets. Since we analyze the effect of l
on the QoS in OPS/OBS, both the original and coded packets
are written as multiple of l, i.e., k = ml and n = m′l. Here
we introduce the metric packet overhead o that is a ratio of
the number of redundant packets and data packets, i.e., o =
r
k
. Notations used in the paper are summarized in Table I.
Packets in the network may be lost due to contention inside
packet switches and due to node/link failures [20]. Note that
we exclude the ingress and egress node from the set of nodes
that can fail.
The CPT scheme is based on FEC codes that are used as
erasure codes. Different coding schemes may be applied for
the CPT, including Maximum Distance Separable (MDS) and
non-MDS codes. Let us denote by GF (2q) the Galois field
with 2q elements. An (n, k, d)2q code is an (n, k)2q code
of length n and rank k with minimum weight d among all
nonzero codewords. An (n, k, d)2q code is called MDS if
d = n − k + 1. The Singleton defect of an (n, k, d)2q code
C defined as s(C) = n − k + 1 − d measures how far away
is C from being MDS. Reed-Solomon codes are the most
commonly used MDS codes, i.e., their Singleton defect is zero
[22]. When Reed-Solomon codes are used, at least k out of n
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF PARAMETERS
ni Ingress node
ne Egress node
k Number of original data packets
n Number of coded packets
r Number of redundant packets
L Packet length
l Number of disjoint paths
m Number of data packets sent on a disjoint path
m′ Number of coded packets sent on a disjoint path
GF (2q) Galois field
p Packet Loss Rate
pthres Packet Loss Rate threshold
o Packet overhead
packets must arrive successfully at the egress node in order to
enable recovery of the data.
An (n, k) linear block code is defined by its n×k generator
matrix G. A code is systematic if the first k rows of its
generator matrix G contain the identity matrix. That means
that a systematic linear code does not transform the original k
data packets, but generates only extra n−k redundant packets.
If the generator matrix G is not systematic then the code
is non-systematic, and all n generated packets linearly depend
on all original k packets via G. Systematic codes are less
processing demanding than non-systematic, since they do not
require processing of the original data. If the goal is to achieve
a certain level of secrecy in the transmitted data, then non-
systematic codes should be used. That is the main reason why
we use non-systematic Reed-Solomon codes.
An (n, k) Reed-Solomon code is obtained by evaluating
polynomials over GF (2q) at n different points α1, α2, . . . , αn.
The generator matrix for Reed-Solomon code is an n × k
Vandermonde matrix
G =


1 α1 α1
2 . . . α1
k−1
1 α2 α2
2 . . . α2
k−1
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
1 αn−1 αn−1
2 . . . αn−1
k−1
1 αn αn
2 . . . αn
k−1


.
The encoding in CPT is performed in the following way.
We assume that the k original data packets with equal length
consist of L symbols from GF (2q), i.e., xi = (si,j) where
1 ≤ i ≤ k and 1 ≤ j ≤ L. The k data packets are presented
in a form of a matrix X where every row represents one data
packet
X =


s1,1 s1,2 . . . s1,L
s2,1 s2,2 . . . s2,L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sk,1 sk,2 . . . sk,L

 .
We obtain the coded packets by simple matrix multiplication
of G with X, i.e.,
Y = G×X.
Similarly as in X, every row of Y represents an encoded
packet. For the sake of clarity we represent the matrix Y in l
stripes of m′ = ⌈n
l
⌉ rows, since we consider transmitting data
on l disjoint paths
Y =


s1,1 s1,2 . . . s1,L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sm′,1 sm′,2 . . . sm′,L
sm′+1,1 sm′+1,2 . . . sm′+1,L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
s2m′,1 s2m′,2 . . . s2m′,L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
s(l−1)m′+1,1 s(l−1)m′+1,2 . . . s(l−1)m′+1,L
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
sn,1 sn,2 . . . sn,L


.
The packets from the i−th stripe are sent on the i−th dis-
joint path, respectively. Once again we emphasise that sending
linear combinations of the data packets instead of using a
systematic code offers secrecy as opposed to systematic codes.
Next we discuss the required parameter settings for enabling
survivability, secrecy and performance within a predefined
PLR threshold.
IV. ANALYTICAL MODEL
A. Topology constraints
The parameter l dictates the number of disjoint paths
between a pair of nodes in the network. We choose to vary
l between 2 and 6, which is grounded in the constraints
provided by most empirical network topologies. Hence, 1+N
protection for a big N is impractical. In the following analysis
we combine path diversity with source coding to meet the
goals of the CPT.
B. Survivability constraints
In order to provide 1+1 path protection against single link
failure, the number of received packets at ne must be equal to
or larger than the original number of data packets, k. Hence,
as the number of lost data packets in the case of a failed path
is m′, we have that
n−m′ ≥ k, (1)
resulting in the following constraint for o
o ≥
1
l − 1
. (2)
C. Secrecy constraints
The goal is to achieve secrecy so that a passive adversary is
not able to reconstruct the whole packet set by eavesdropping
on a single path. We use here the term secrecy as it is used
in [11, Ch.7 pp. 185].
An eavesdropper needs to eavesdrop k packets in order to
decode the whole packet set. By eavesdropping on a single
path, m′ packets are obtained. Hence, we ensure that by
eavesdropping on a single path it is not possible to recover
the data packets if the following
k ≥ m′ (3)
is fullfiled. Resulting in the following constraint for o
o ≤ l − 1. (4)
One straightforward attack on the secrecy of CPT is by
applying the strategy described by McEliece and Sarwate in
[10]. The authors conclude that decoding algorithms for Reed-
Solomon codes provide extensions and generalizations of the
Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [23].
We adapt the strategy discussed in the last paragraph of
[10]. Namely, the attack is a combination of a partially known
coded text and a brute force attack. An eavesdropper knows
or guesses the format or even the content of some parts of
the coded information and performs an exhaustive search to
check all possible linear combinations in order to filter out the
wrong guesses and to find the correct ones. We give a short
example where we show that constraint 4 is not enough for
providing secrecy when an eavesdropper is able to guess the
missing packets, i.e., run a brute force attack.
Example 1: Based on constraints 2 and 4, the network is in
the operational range of CPT if l = 3 and o = 1. We define
a range as operational when the secrecy and the survivability
constraints are not violated. Let us take the following Reed-
Solomon code (12, 6) over GF (28). If we want to achieve
survivability and secrecy, 4 packets are sent on each disjoint
path. However, if an eavesdropper gets the coded packets from
a single path, he/she gets 4 coded packets. The eavesdropper
requires 2 more coded packets to decode the whole data set.
Since the coding is performed over GF (28), it applies an
exhaustive search of 22×8 = 216 tries for every 2 missing
bytes from the 2 missing packets. Knowing the format of the
submitted information (which is a reasonable and plausible
assumption) the eavesdropper filters out all solutions that do
not fit within its filtering strategy and keeps the solutions that
give decoded information that has the expected format.
We combine the attack technique discussed above with the
modern recommended levels of security as they are given
in [1], [4], [8]. The minimum level of security for 2015 is
between 80 and 112 bits (Lenstra/Verhul, ECRYPT II, NIST),
but we put a level of 128 bits as a long term security level.
So we derive an additional constraint for secrecy in CPT
considering these recommendations, i.e.,
(k −m′)q ≥ 128 (5)
resulting in the following constraint for o
o ≤ l − 1−
128
qm
. (6)
Example 2: In this example we still assume that l=3 and
o=1. The coding is performed with Reed-Solomon over
GF (28), but n and k are choosen following constraint 6. Let
us take the Reed-Solomon code (96, 48) over GF (28). On
each disjoint path 32 packets are sent. If an eavesdropper gets
the coded packets on a single path, still it misses 16 packets
to decode the original data. Running an exhaustive search of
216×8 = 2128 tries for every 16 missing bytes from the 16
missing packets is infeasible.
D. Performance constraints
When the PLR is p and the loss of the redundant packets is
accounted, then the average number of redundant packets is
r =
kp
1− p
. (7)
However, adding r redundant packets does not guarantee
that the PLR is kept bellow a predefined threshold pthres.
Unsuccessful decoding occurs when more than r packets
are lost. The probability of unsuccessful decoding pfail when
RS codes are used is
pfail =
n∑
i=n−k+1
(
n
i
)
pi(1 − p)n−i. (8)
If one path has failed, still data packets on the nonfailed
paths can be lost due to contentions. The required number of
redundant packets is calculated for n′ = n−m′ and pfail ≤
pthres, i.e., from the following expression
n′∑
i=n′−k+1
(
n′
i
)
pi(1− p)n
′
−i ≤ pthres. (9)
E. Processing constraints
Since in CPT we add redundancy of n− k packets and we
use non-systematic RS codes, we introduce processing delay.
The processing delay is expressed in number of clock cycles.
The processing delay should not be confused with latency,
because it is a component of the latency. Since decoding is
more computationally demanding than encoding, we calculate
the processing delay at the egress node. The processing delay
is defined as the number of clock cycles required for a packet
set to enter, be processed and leave the egress node.
In [21] the processing delay in number of clock cycles
per symbol for a RS systematic code (n, k) at the decoder
is calculated as
dproc = (n− k)
2 + 6(n− k) + 4. (10)
If the processing delay for the packet set is greater than the
size of the packet set, dproc > n, then the node should buffer
the packets arriving from the next packet set while processing
the previous one.
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Fig. 3. The operational range for CPT for m = 32 and coding over GF (28)
The time to process the packet set for a systematic code
is dependent on the number of redundant packets n− k. For
a non-systematic code, the size of the whole packet set n
should be counted, not just n − k. First we obtain the delay
for processing a single packet and then we multiply it with
the total number of packets in the packet set. Therefore, the
processing delay in number of clock cycles per symbol for a
RS non-systematic code (n, k) at the decoder is
dproc = ⌈
n
n− k
⌉((n− k)2 + 6(n− k) + 4). (11)
V. PARAMETER SETTINGS FOR CPT
Figure 3 shows the operational range of the CPT, i.e., the
relationship between the number of available disjoint paths
between a node pair (l) and the packet overhead (o). Three
different areas are identified:
1) The operational range for the CPT scheme;
2) The secrecy constraints are violated;
3) The survivability constraints are violated.
As a general insight, we observe that a certain amount of
packet overhead needs to be provided in order to ensure
survivability (protection against one failure). Furthermore,
sending a certain amount of data packets less than k on each
path should guarantee secrecy against eavesdropping. Thus,
the combination of o and l should be in the operational range.
Figure 3 is produced for m = 32 and coding over GF (28).
Figure 4 depicts the required overhead ratio for different
PLR when k = 32, 64 and 128 and pthres=10−12. Here it
is shown that the packet overhead required to keep the PLR
below a predefined pthres is less than the required packet
overhead to achieve survivability against single link failure.
Figure 5 illustrates the operational range when we consider
constraint (9) in addition to the constraints for survivability and
secrecy. The n−m′ packets sent on the nonfailed paths may
still be lost due to contentions that means additional overhead
is needed. The operational range reduces as the PLR increases.
We draw the operational range for p=0.01 and 0.001 besides
the one presented in Figure 3.
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Fig. 4. Required packet overhead for different PLR so that pfail ≤ pthres
for pthres=10−12
P
a
ck
et
o
ve
rh
ea
d
o
Ê
Ê
Ê
Ê
‡
‡
‡
‡
Ï
Ï
Ï
Ï
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ú
Ê p=0.01
‡ p=0.001
2 3 4 5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
3
3.5
4
Number of disjoint paths l
2SHUDWLRQDOUDQJHIRU&37
3HUIRUPDQFHDQGVXUYLYDELOLW\FRQVWUDLQWVYLRODWHG
6HFUHF\FRQVWUDLQWVYLRODWHG
Fig. 5. The reduced operational range for CPT for m=32, coding over
GF (28) when p=0.01 and 0.001 and pthres=10−12
In the previous Section we choose small parameteres for n
and k for simplified explanation. We give other examples in
Table II where n is equal to 2q − 1 and the parameters are
chosen to satisfy the survivavility and secrecy constraints.
Figure 6 shows the processing delay for a systematic code
and two non-systematic RS codes for k = 32 and 64. The
processing delay for the non-systematic codes is significantly
higher than for the systematic code. This is because that the
total number of packets processed by a non-systematic code is
greater than the number of redundant packets processed by a
systematic code. The processing delay increases as r increases
for the both cases. As it is illustrated in Figure 6, the number
of data packets k has an impact on the processing delay in
addition to r for a non-systematic code. When non-systematic
coding is performed, the decoder will always process the
packets from the previous packet set while packets from a
new packet set arrive. This is not the case for a systematic
code for some parameter selections.
We conclude that the survivability, performance and secrecy
that the CPT offers are at a price of an increased processing
delay. The CPT offers better performance compared to 1+1 or
TABLE II
EXAMPLES WHERE n = 2q − 1
q k r o m′ l Secrecy level in bits
5 25 6 0.24 5 and 6 6 95
6 42 21 0.5 21 3 126
7 84 43 0.512 42 and 43 3 287
8 204 51 0.25 51 5 1224
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Fig. 6. Processing delay in clock cycles per symbol for a systematic and
non-systematic RS code
1+N protection, where the overhead ratio is 1. In order to keep
the CPT scheme in the operational range, either the overhead
ratio should be greater than 0.5 or the number of disjoint paths
should be equal to or more than 3. The CPT scheme offers
both survivability and secrecy with less overhead compared to
traditional 1+1 path protection, which offers only survivability
against a single failure for 100% overhead ratio.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented the Coded Packet Transport (CPT)
scheme, a novel transport mechanism for Optical Packet/Burst
Switched (OPS/OBS) networks. The CPT scheme is able
to recover packets lost due to contentions and node/link
failures, as well as providing secrecy in OPS/OBS networks.
We have presented the conceptual architecture for the CPT
scheme, along with analytical results, outlining the achievable
performance. Further research on this topic should investigate
the performance in realistic network topologies.
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